


















	 But	Socrates	clearly	rejects	the	assumption.	He	calls	the	conception	of	eudaimonia	that	drives	Adeimantus'	objection	to	the	guardians'	situation	"foolish	and	adolescent"	(466b).	In	fact,	Socrates	objects	not	merely	to	conceptions	of	well-being	according	to	which	wealth	and	power	are	necessary.	He	offers	reasons	to	doubt	a	broad	range	of	"objective	list"	views	of	well-being.			 He	advances	one	reason	in	the	Euthydemus.	After	Socrates	and	Cleinias	complete	their	list	of	the	goods	that	are	supposed	to	make	life	go	well,	Socrates	argues	Nirst	that	the	possession	of	a	good	would	not	make	one's	life	go	well	unless	that	good	beneNited	one	and	that	a	good	would	not	beneNit	one	unless	it	were	used	(280b-e).	He	then	argues	that	using	a	good	would	not	beneNit	one	unless	it	were	used	rightly	and	that	using	a	good	rightly	requires	using	it	wisely	(280e-281b).	A	large	part	of	Socrates'	reasoning	here	is	immediately	accessible	to	Cleinias.	If	we	have	advantages	such	as	wealth,	power,	or	honor,	we	have	a	greater	capacity	to	act	than	if	we	lack	these	things,	and	it	is	better	for	us	to	have	a	greater	capacity	to	act	only	if	we	act	wisely.	Wielding	great	power	foolishly	does	us	no	good.			 But	Socrates	pushes	this	reasoning	beyond	common	sense.	Because	the	things	ordinarily	thought	to	be	good	for	us	seem	to	depend	in	large	measure	on	luck,	the	proponent	of	the	initial	"objective	list"	view	can	sum	up	his	view	by	saying	that	good	fortune	makes	our	lives	go	well.	Socrates	insists,	instead,	that	wisdom	plays	the	role	of	good	fortune	(279d),	that	it	makes	our	lives	go	well	(281b).	His	point	seems	to	be	that	the	causal	power	to	beneNit,	to	make	a	life	go	well,	cannot	belong	to	all	the	initially	listed	goods,	because	most	of	them	sometimes	beneNit	us	and	sometimes	harm	us,	depending	on	whether	they	are	used	wisely	or	foolishly	(281d-e).	On	his	view,	only	wisdom	possesses	
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	 One	sophisticated	way	to	develop	the	ordinary	thought	that	a	life	goes	well	by	the	possession	of	good	things	vindicates	every	member	of	that	family	of	views	(and	then	some).	Protagoras	says	that	a	human	being	is	the	measure	of	the	things	that	are	and	are	not,	and	Plato's	Theaetetus	construes	this	as	the	thought,	for	instance,	that	if	the	wind	appears	cold	to	Peter	and	warm	to	Paul,	then	the	wind	is	cold	for	Peter	and	it	is	warm	for	Paul	(151d-160e).	(Actually,	Socrates	seems	to	imply	that	Protagoras	is	committed	to	thinking	that	if	the	wind	appears	cold	to	Peter,	then	the	wind-for-Peter	is-for-Peter	cold-for-Peter, 	4but	I	will	proceed	with	a	slightly	simpliNied	picture	in	view.)		 In	the	Theaetetus,	Socrates	addresses	more	than	one	Protagoreanism.	He	sometimes	worries	about	a	perfectly	general	version	of	the	"measure	doctrine,"	so	that	whatever	kind	
	Waterlow	(1977:	33-34),	Lee	(2005:	44-47).4
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is	most	able	to	do	what	it	wants,	and	suffers	least	from	regret,	neediness,	and	fear.	As	a	result,	Socrates	and	Glaucon	agree,	the	tyrannical	soul	enjoys	the	least	well-being	(eudaimonia)	and	the	aristocratic	soul	the	most.	This	inference	seems	to	identify	well-being	with	good	feelings	and	the	absence	of	bad	feelings.	The	second	and	third	proofs	are	even	clearer.	Though	they	are	supposed	to	establish	the	same	conclusion	as	the	Nirst,	concerning	well-being	(eudaimonia)	(583b),	they	explicitly	show	that	the	just	person's	aristocratically	constituted	soul	enjoys	the	most	pleasure,	more	than	any	unjust	person's	soul	(580c-588a).	Because	Socrates	advances	these	as	proofs	of	the	thesis	he	plainly	endorses,	it	is	natural	to	suppose	that	he	endorses	the	broadly	hedonist	conception	of	well-being	they	invoke. 	12	 But	this	cannot	be	right.	Socrates	and	his	interlocutors	in	the	Republic	agree	that	well-being	(eudaimonia)	is	the	ultimate	end	"which	every	soul	pursues	and	for	the	sake	of	which	every	soul	does	everything	it	does"	(505e1-2). 	But	in	the	Republic	Socrates	13explicitly	rejects	pleasure	and	good	feelings	as	this	end.	In	fact,	he	appeals	to	both	considerations	that	he	offers	against	Calliclean	hedonism	in	the	Gorgias.	First,	he	insists	that	pleasure	is	not	unconditionally	good,	because	there	are	intrinsically	bad	pleasures	(505c;	cf.	509a).	This	makes	pleasure	a	bad	Nit	to	be	what	fully	justiNies	action.	Socrates	underscores	this	point	with	reNlection	on	the	Protagorean	side	of	the	broadly	hedonist	approach	to	well-being.	What	feels	or	appears	good	to	one	is	not	the	same	as	what	is	good	for	one,	and	the	ultimate	end	is	what	is	good	for	one	(505d). 		 	14	 	
	Butler	(2003).12	Notice	the	terms	of	the	challenge	put	to	Socrates	and	of	his	answer:	347e	with	352d,	358a,	361c-d,	365c-d,	13545a-b,	580b-c.	See	Kamtekar	(2006).14
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Second,	Socrates	argues	that	the	pursuit	of	pleasure	and	good	feelings	undermines	itself.	This	emerges	as	a	corollary	to	his	critique	of	spirited	and	especially	appetitive	desire.	The	critique	rests	on	three	observations.	First,	because	good	feelings	arrive	with	the	satisfaction	of	desire,	they	can	come	cheaply.	All	three	parts	of	the	human	soul	have	their	own	pleasures	(581c),	and	agents	of	many	different	kinds	achieve	good	feelings.	Next,	if	spirited	and	appetitive	desires	are	indulged	and	are	not	held	in	check	by	countervailing	commitments	to	what	is	genuinely	good	for	one,	they	will	grow	stronger	and	more	numerous	(589a-b	with	571b-572b,	416e-417a,	549a-b;	cf.	602c-606d).	Third,	as	spirited	and	appetitive	desires	grow,	they	increasingly	conNlict	with	each	other	and	in	other	ways	increasingly	outstrip	our	ability	to	satisfy	them,	leading	to	the	regret,	neediness,	and	fear	that	characterize	the	tyrannical	soul.	This	empirical	critique,	like	the	"paradox	of	hedonism," 	suggests	that	there	is	something	self-defeating	about	pursuing	pleasure	15directly.	But	because	well-being,	as	the	ultimate	end,	is	supposed	to	explain	as	well	as	justify	action,	one	must	be	able	to	successfully	pursue	it	directly.	So	the	empirical	critique	impugns	hedonist	conceptions	of	well-being.			Socrates'	rejection	of	hedonist	theories	of	well-being	in	the	Republic	further	explains	why	he	rejects	Adeimantus'	appeal	to	a	naïve	"objective	list"	approach,	too	(466b,	with	419a-420a).	Many	of	the	goods	on	the	"objective	list"	are	only	conditionally	valuable,	and	are	the	objects	of	spirited	and	appetitive	desire.	So	they	are	problematic	as	ultimate	ends,	and,	as	we	will	see	below,	as	constituents	of	the	ultimate	end.		 		 We	might	still	wonder	about	Republic's	stance	on	well-being.	Why	would	Socrates	invoke	broadly	hedonist	conceptions	of	well-being	that	he	rejects	in	order	to	argue	for	his	
	See	XXX	(this	volume:	XXX).15
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	 Against	Protagoras,	Socrates	maintains	that	well-being	is	a	matter	of	objective	fact,	discoverable	by	the	wise.	Against	hedonists,	he	maintains	that	well-being	must	be	an	unconditional	good	that	one	can	successfully	pursue	directly.	These	arguments	make	trouble	for	many	of	the	goods	on	the	naïve	list	of	what	causes	our	lives	to	go	well.	But	they	make	no	trouble	for	wisdom	and	especially,	if	we	recall	the	Euthydemus'	insistence	on	use	or	activity,	wise	activity.	And	in	fact	Socrates	frequently	insists	that	well-being—doing	well,	being	successful—is	identical	to	virtuous	activity	(Charm.	171e-172a,	Cr.	48b,	Euthd.	278e-282d,	Gorg.	507c,	Rep.	353e-354a),	and	since	he	also	frequently	insists	that	virtue	is	or	at	least	requires	wisdom, 	he	can	also	be	taken	to	say	that	well-being	is	wisevirtuous	17activity.		 Although	Socrates	suggests	this	view	in	Book	One	of	the	Republic	(353e-354a),	he	cannot	assume	it	in	the	rest	of	the	dialogue,	since	Glaucon	and	Adeimantus	issue	a	challenge	that	rests	on	a	competing	conception	of	well-being.	This	helps	to	explain	why	Socrates'	arguments	in	the	Republic	appeal,	as	we	have	seen,	to	a	conception	of	well-being	that	he	rejects	and	why	so	few	readers	of	Plato	attribute	to	him	this	clear,	Socratic	conception	of	well-being	as	virtuous	activity. 	18	 But	there	are	also	other	reasons	why	readers	miss	this.	First,	the	Socratic	view	seems	to	Nit	poorly	with	Socrates'	broader	understanding	of	value.	At	least	apart	from	the	
	For	the	identity	claim,	the	"unity	of	virtues"	thesis,	see	Penner	(1973).	17	Compare,	for	instance,	the	characterizations	of	Socrates'	conception(s)	of	well-being	in	the	Republic	by	18Annas	(1981:	314-334)	and	Reeve	(1988:	153-159).	
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Euthydemus,	he	identiNies	things	other	than	wisdom	as	good	for	us,	and	he	even	insists	that	some	such	things	are	non-instrumentally	good	for	us	(e.g.,	Rep.	357b-358a).	But	Socrates	can	consider	something	to	be	non-instrumentally	good—good	regardless	of	what	follows	from	it—without	thinking	that	it	is	unconditionally	good—good	in	all	circumstances.	A	pleasantly	amusing	activity	might	be	Ninally	valuable,	but	not	unconditionally	so,	because	it	would	not	be	good	when,	say,	virtue	required	helping	someone. 	The	recognition	of	Ninal	19goods	other	than	virtuous	activity	does	not	entail	the	recognition	of	unconditional	goods	other	than	wise	virtuous	activity,	and	as	the	ultimate	goal	to	explain	and	justify	action,	well-being	must	be	an	unconditional	good.				 Nevertheless,	even	if	Socrates	does	not	have	to	identify	Ninal	goods	as	constituents	of	well-being	and	parts	of	the	ultimate	end,	he	still	might	do	so.	Even	if	goods	other	than	virtue	and	virtuous	activity	are	only	conditionally	valuable,	still	they	might	be	conditionally	valuable	parts	of	an	unconditionally	valuable	whole,	and	Socrates	might	be	thought	to	develop	this	possibility	in	the	Philebus. 	But	the	Philebus	addresses	three	questions	that	20are	not	easily	kept	distinct:	(1)	What	is	the	successful	life	like?	(2)	What	things	are	good	for	a	human	being,	by	causally	promoting	a	successful	life?	and	(3)	What	is	the	good	for	a	human	being,	the	ultimate	goal	of	action,	which	is	the	success	of	a	successful	life?	Socrates	plainly	suggests	that	a	successful	life	is	a	mixed	life,	including	various	pleasures	and	knowledge	(60c-61a,	cf.	22a-23a),	and	he	plainly	thinks	that	some	pleasures	and	knowledge	are	good	for	a	human	being.	But	does	he	conclude	that	these	various	goods	constitute	a	single	unconditional	good	that	is	the	success	of	a	successful	life?	It	seems,	
	Cf.	Korsgaard	(1983).	19	Cooper	(1977).20
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rather,	that	he	means	to	isolate	the	best	part	of	a	mixed	life,	and	to	assign	a	special	role	to	it	(64c-d).	He	says	that	what	makes	a	mixture	of	goods	a	successful	life	is	what	puts	this	mixture	into	a	kind	of	unity,	manifesting	beauty,	measure,	and	truth	(64d-65a).	This	seems	to	locate	the	success	of	a	successful	life	not	in	the	various	goods	mixed	into	it,	but	in	the	wise	way	in	which	they	are	mixed.	If	this	is	what	Socrates	means,	then	he	is	not	taking	back	his	thought	that	the	unconditional	good,	the	ultimate	goal	of	action,	is	virtuous	or	wise	activity.					 Charity	might	generate	a	third	reason	to	doubt	that	Plato	fully	endorses	a	Socratic	conception	of	well-being	as	virtuous	activity.	After	all,	this	conception	is	indeterminate	to	the	point	of	being	uninformative.	For	what	is	virtuous	activity?	It	certainly	will	not	do	to	say	that	it	is	the	sort	of	activity	that	is	done	for	the	sake	of	being	virtuous	activity.	But	Plato's	dialogues	offer	two	ways	of	identifying	virtuous	activity.	The	Nirst	is	psychology.	Virtue	is	the	disposition	that	makes	its	possessor	do	what	it	essentially	does	well	(Rep.	352d-354d).	To	give	an	account	of	the	virtues	of	the	soul,	then,	one	must	Nirst	give	an	account	of	how	the	soul	works.	An	account	of	healthy	and	unhealthy	psychological	functioning	will	identify	the	virtues	as	the	dispositions	of	healthy	functioning. 	21	 The	second	way	of	identifying	virtue	is	wisdom.	For	Plato,	virtue	is	or	requires	wisdom,	and	wisdom	is	or	requires	a	coherent	grasp	of	how	things	are.	So	virtue	is	determined	not	merely	from	the	"scientiNic"	point	of	view,	working	out	an	explanatory	account	of	how,	say,	anger	works,	or	love,	or	lust,	but	also	from	the	agent's	point	of	view,	working	out	how	these	feelings,	and	the	values	they	implicate,	do	and	do	not	hang	together	with	each	other	and	with	all	our	other	attitudes.	Only	if	we	can	survive	Socratic	
	Cf.	XXX		on	perfectionism	(this	volume).21
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examination	can	we	begin	to	think	that	we	might	be	wise	and	virtuous,	and	this	constrains	what	wise	and	virtuous	activity	could	be. 		22	 Of	course,	these	methods	are	hard,	and	reasonable	people	can	disagree	about	where	they	lead.	The	many	followers	of	Socrates	and	Plato	who	embraced	the	Socratic	conception	of	well-being	as	virtuous	activity	disagreed	sharply	about	what	virtuous	activity	is.	Some,	including	Cynics	and	Stoics,	took	a	more	ascetic,	but	also	more	democratic	and	psychologized,	view:	they	think	that	virtuous	activity	is	available	to	anyone,	just	by	the	achievement	of	psychological	coherence,	and	not	requiring	good	fortune	in	one's	external	circumstances.	Others,	such	as	Aristotle,	believe	that	virtuous	activity,	as	the	best	realization	of	the	best	condition	a	human	being	can	be	in,	is	what	a	powerful,	beautiful,	wealthy,	and	in	other	ways	fortunate	member	of	a	ruling	élite	does.	On	this	view,	humans	naturally	desire	certain	aristocratic	ends,	and	virtuous	activity	is	hampered,	even	if	only	slightly,	by	the	frustration	of	these	desires.	So,	on	this	view,	pPsychological	coherence	itself	requires	some	good	fortune.	These	debates	between	Peripatetics	and	Stoics	play	out	possibilities	left	open	by	Plato's	dialogues,	as	Greek	philosophers	tried	to	determine	what	well-being	is	by	determining	what	virtuous	activity	is. 	23
Related	topics	
Aristotle,	Objective	List	Theories,	Perfectionism,	Subjectivism,	Hedonism.		
	On	coherence	as	a	constraint,	cf.	XXX	(this	volume).22	This	chapter	condenses	interpretations	I	develop	at	greater	length	elsewhere,	and	I	thank	those	who	have	23helped	with	those	forthcoming	essays,	including	especially	Emily	Austin,	Scott	Berman,	Erik	Curiel,	Matt	Evans,	Verity	Harte,	Rusty	Jones,	Rachana	Kamtekar,	Richard	Kraut,	Casey	Perin,	David	Reeve,	Clerk	Shaw,	Rachel	Singpurwalla,	Iakovos	Vasiliou,	Matt	Walker,	and	Eric	Wiland.
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Suggestions	for	Further	Reading	
Plato,	especially	the	Euthydemus,	Protagoras,	Gorgias,	Republic,	and	Philebus.	For	alternatives	to	the	interpretations	mooted	here,	start	with	Irwin	(1995)	and	Annas	(1999).	
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